Conflict, Repression and Resistance from Colonialism to Military Rule (2024)

Maaike Matelski

With the exception of 2011–20, Burma/Myanmar has the questionable honour of being the longest running military dictatorship in the world. The consecutive military governments that came to power in 1962 and 1988 were each known for their severe human rights violations, and the military leadership that took power in the 2021 coup has even surpassed their violent legacies. This chapter provides a brief historical overview, explaining how contestations over territory, political structures and ethnic minority rights have been recurring since before colonial independence and provided a motive for the military to continue its rule. Pre-existing tensions as a result of ethnic diversity had been exacerbated during British colonialism, which ended in 1948, and were far from solved when a military coup in 1962 brought an end to the recently established parliamentary democracy. Nationalist sentiments intensified as ethnic nationalities struggled for self-determination, while Buddhist nationalism also surfaced periodically, re-appearing in the course of the political transition period that started in 2010. Respective periods of nation building resulted in both extensive military rule and the search for a Burman Buddhist identity at the expense of indigenous minorities.

British colonialism and nationalist resistance

Between 1824 and 1886, the British took control of the territory now known as Myanmar during three Anglo-Burmese wars and engaged in violent pacification campaigns towards the local population. The Burmans, in turn, had come to dominate the earlier inhabitants of the territory, including the Karen and the Mon (Harvey, 1925; Lieberman, 1984). Burma initially became part of British India and from 1937 was a separate colony. In their efforts to formally map territorial boundaries, the British brought together a number of previously unaffiliated ethnic and linguistic groups. A division was created between the central area inhabited by the majority Burman population and the current ethnic states in the border areas, where bureaucratic rule by the British remained largely absent. The colonizers brought in staff for administrative positions from elsewhere and treated Burma as a less advanced and less profitable part of British India, which increasingly upset the Burmese population. In her book Making Enemies, Mary Callahan (2003) describes how the indigenous population was treated as an internal threat to colonial rule rather than inhabitants entitled to protection and inclusion in institution building. The British created territorial boundaries that had not previously existed as well as arbitrary divisions between ethnic identities, contributing to ‘politicized violence along ethnic lines’ (Callahan, 2003: 22). They succeeded in establishing good relationships with some of the ethnic nationalities (mainly the Chin and the Kachin), who accepted British rule in exchange for non-interference in local affairs such as taxation. Some of them were also actively recruited for the British army in Burma, which by the early 1940s consisted of only 12 per cent Burmans.1Close

Burman nationalist sentiments increased under colonial rule. Resistance was led by prominent Buddhist monks, while peasant populations also protested, particularly against detrimental economic policies (Taylor, 2009; Aung-Thwin, 2011). These groups joined forces in the Hsaya San Rebellion (referred to as the ‘Burma Rebellion’ by the British),2Close a two-year movement (1930–32) named after a rural Buddhist leader who sought attention for peasant grievances. This uprising, although violently suppressed, marked the start of a ‘tradition of boycott and avoidance of the state’ (Taylor, 2009: 196). The Burman resentment about ethnic nationalities collaborating with foreign entities continued to dominate their views on who should be considered part of Burmese society, and Burman activists set up several nationalist groups called tats. Rangoon University students set up the Dobama Asiayone (‘We Burmans Association’, also known as the Thakin Party) in the 1930s. After World War II, members of this group played a central role in the independence movement, and student groups continued to be politically active in the following decades. Meanwhile, ethnic nationalities also organized themselves to represent their distinct social, cultural and political interests, which strengthened their nationalist sentiments (Taylor, 2009: 181).3Close

Ethnic segregation was further fostered during World War II. While some minorities supported the Allies, Burman nationalists started the Burma Independence Army (BIA) led by General Aung San with assistance from the Japanese. The BIA would support the Japanese until 1945, while communist and Karen armed groups cooperated with the British to remove the Japanese from power (Taylor, 2009). In 1945, Aung San withdrew his support for the Japanese and sided with the British and various political allies, including ethnic nationalities, to liberate the country under the banner of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). After the Japanese were defeated, Aung San led negotiations for independence from the British. He also negotiated with ethnic nationalities, resulting in the Panglong Agreement that was signed on 12 February 1947. This agreement, which arranged for the Chin, Kachin and Shan to join Burma in a federal union, has continued to be used as a source of legitimacy for ethnic self-determination struggles.4Close Although Aung San promised the ethnic nationalities equal treatment, they felt betrayed by the 1947 constitution, which laid the foundation for a centralized system (Callahan, 2003: 94). Aung San, perhaps the sole person on whom all parties had relied to bring inter-ethnic unity, was tragically assassinated by political rivals on 19 July 1947 before any of his promises could be realized. According to some scholars, the ‘Panglong Spirit’ has since become an ahistorical myth propagated by Burman-dominated governments proclaiming harmonious ethnic relations that never actually existed (Walton, 2008; Sadan, 2013: 304).

Post-independence politics and the start of military rule

After Burma achieved formal independence on 4 January 1948, Aung San’s AFPFL emerged as the leading party, with U Nu as the first elected prime minister. He would remain in that position intermittently until 1962.5Close U Nu’s rule can be considered largely democratic, and elections were held in 1947, 1951–52, 1956 and 1960. Yet he was simply unable to undo all the disrupting effects of colonialism, World War II and the assassination of Aung San. The many weapons circulating after the war in combination with the simmering ethnic grievances and the geopolitical effects of the Cold War posed major challenges to his rule, and civil war soon erupted. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which had gone underground in its struggle against the British, soon launched its armed resistance against the newly independent state and would remain a popular political party in post-independence Burma (Lintner, 1990: 25).6Close Ethnic groups continued to demand federalism, autonomy and independence, and several of them took up arms against what they perceived as Burman domination, with the Karen National Union (KNU), created in 1947, posing a particularly serious threat (Charney, 2009: 75). During the Cold War, Chinese Kuomintang soldiers entered Burmese territory and joined forces with some of the ethnic insurgent groups in the border areas, creating fear of a Chinese invasion (Lintner, 1990: 29). Faced with these internal and external threats, the military quickly expanded its size and rule and came to consider itself a guardian needed to govern the country.7Close While it took on responsibility for everything from law enforcement to economic and political affairs, it proved unable to secure electoral support and increasingly came to see the domestic population as its enemy (Callahan, 2003). Worried that the new elections would lead to disturbances or other undesired outcomes, the military successfully suggested that U Nu stage a ‘constitutional coup’ (Callahan, 2003: 188). During this first period of military rule, which lasted from October 1958 to April 1960, General Ne Win served as the head of a ‘Caretaker Government’.8Close This was a reasonably successful government which, given the politically chaotic democratic period, was ‘not entirely unwelcome’ to the Burmese public (Lintner, 1990: 14). Yet the army continued its repression of ethnic insurgents and relocated part of the population of Rangoon to new satellite towns in remote suburbs, which ‘soon became breeding grounds for anti-army discontent’ (Lintner, 1990: 35–6).

For reasons that can only be speculated on, the military organized elections in 1960. These elections, referred to as ‘free and unfair’, were again won by U Nu, contrary to the military’s expectations (Callahan, 2003: 197). These were to be the last credible Burmese elections of the 20th century of which the results were honoured. With threats of instability remaining from the side of the communists, the Karen, the Shan and the newly founded Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in 1961, Ne Win worried about the political and economic prospects of the country. He staged another coup on 2 March 1962, which, contrary to the previous one, was ‘entirely unconstitutional’ (Holliday, 2011: 47). The army suspended the 1947 constitution, dissolved the parliament, the judiciary and other established institutions and took full and indefinite control of the country. Ne Win would remain in power for 26 years, although he hardly ever appeared in public (Taylor, 2009: 322). After the 1962 military coup, U Nu and other winners of the 1960 elections were imprisoned, and single-party rule was formally established with the creation of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).9Close Military rule ended formally (but not de facto) in 1974, as Ne Win handed over power to the People’s Assembly, which elected him as president. During this period, he built up the notorious Military Intelligence Service (Selth, 1998). Political dissidents and their supporters were arrested, imprisoned and sometimes tortured, and informers even infiltrated the growing Burmese community in exile (Lintner, 1990; Selth, 1998).

A new constitution was put in place in 1974 containing provisions for the single-party Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. The country was divided into seven ‘ethnic nationality states’ (Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon and Shan) and seven ‘divisions’ which were predominantly inhabited by Burmans.10Close In the borderlands, inhabited mostly by ethnic nationalities, over 20 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) controlled their own territories and administrations (Smith, 1999: 16). The military implemented its infamous ‘four cuts strategy’, whereby the ethnic armies were cut off from recruits, food, finance and intelligence. A controversial Citizenship Act would follow in 1982, which distinguished between ‘full citizens’ (Burmans, plus other ethnic groups who could prove they were related to Burmese citizens before the Anglo-Burmese wars), ‘associate citizens’ (those who were born in Burma after 1823, such as many Indians and Chinese), and ‘naturalized citizens’ whose citizenship could be revoked if they were ‘disloyal to the state’. Only the first group could vote, take on all political positions and participate in higher education (Steinberg, 2010: 72–3).

The BSPP proved particularly weak in economic governance, and the country’s economy quickly collapsed. The government became completely isolationist, nationalized around 15,000 businesses, expelled many foreigners (predominantly Indians) from the country and hardly allowed any foreign visitors. Many educated Burmese became unemployed and decided to leave the country, while groups of ethnic nationalities fled the ongoing civil wars. BSPP rule, though ‘nominally socialist’, was in fact a ‘deeply dysfunctional form of state capitalism’ with nationalist and xenophobic features (Holliday, 2011: 51). The economic crisis of the 1980s caused further hardship, as poverty levels increased and Burma obtained least developed country status with the UN in 1987, which caused great shame among the population (Steinberg, 2001: 131). Students, who were also severely affected by this economic decline, openly showed their discontent in what would become a mass movement that brought an end to the BSPP era, but not to military rule.

The ‘four eights’ uprising and continued military rule

A violent incident in a Rangoon teashop on 12 March 1988 involving the son of a local BSPP representative became the starting point of a large uprising. The man’s preferential treatment invoked a demonstration by Rangoon University students, in which one person was shot and killed by the authorities (Lintner, 1990). His fellow students demanded justice, but the government denied responsibility. Protesting students were met with increased violence, including the killing of dozens of demonstrators at the ‘White Bridge’ in Rangoon (Skidmore, 2004: 89). After about 1,000 students had been arrested and imprisoned, the protestors were able to gather country-wide support. Ne Win attempted to de-escalate the situation by stepping down from his position in the BSPP and proposing a referendum on a multiparty system, a proposal that was rejected by congress (Charney, 2009: 151). This option, however, inspired the students to call for democracy, rather than merely protesting against the government’s violent tactics as they had done before (Holliday, 2011: 55). Monks, dockworkers, civil servants, businesspeople and religious leaders joined in, resulting in a large strike and demonstrations. An estimated one million people from various ethnic and religious backgrounds were involved in Rangoon and Mandalay alone at the height of the demonstrations on 8 August 1988, which would become known as the Four Eights (or 8888) uprising. Although largely peaceful, some demonstrators targeted and even killed suspected government representatives, including policemen (Lintner, 1990: 102). The army’s violent response resulted in many casualties, with numbers ranging from 440 according to official government statistics to eyewitness estimates of 1,000 to 3,000 or more (Lintner, 1990: 103; Brooten, 2004: 175; Fink, 2009: 52). Information on this demonstration hardly reached the international community, with the first report by Amnesty International only appearing in 1989 (Lintner, 1990). Over 10,000 dissidents left Rangoon, and some even fled the country. This would mark the start of the ‘democracy movement’ in exile (described in Chapter 2).

As the calls for democracy grew and spread throughout the country, Aung San’s daughter Aung San Suu Kyi, who had returned from her home in the UK to visit her mother, decided to respond to appeals to get politically involved, a call that had been largely inspired by her father’s reputation. On 15 August 1988, she signed a letter calling on the government to end the political crisis (Lintner, 1990: 108). The next week, martial law was suddenly lifted in Rangoon. After a number of prominent demonstrators had been released from prison, Aung San Suu Kyi gave a speech on 26 August at the famous Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon to an audience of over 500,000 people, in which she called for democracy and a ‘second struggle for independence’. Her eloquence and reference to her father’s legacy gained her much support and inspired people to turn against the government and resign from its organizations (Lintner, 1990: 116). On 18 September, a military group led by General Saw Maung announced that it would take control of the country to restore order and prepare for multiparty elections. By 26 September, the State Law and Order Restoration Council had been formed. Its acronym SLORC was ‘seized upon for its Orwellian overtones by the foreign press and Western diplomats’ (Taylor, 2009: 388).11Close

The post-1988 military government abandoned all ideology and pronounced ‘law and order’ to be its sole objective (Cheesman, 2015). The primary goal became the restoration of ‘peace and tranquillity’ and the suppression of ‘destructive elements’ in order to secure its own position (Lintner, 1990: 138). The ‘three main national causes’, which could be found in state media and on public billboards were non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty. SLORC Martial Law Order 2/88 set limitations on public meetings of five or more persons, which could only be held with advance permission from the authorities, a provision that has remained in place since. Many dissidents were arrested and received long prison sentences. Senior General Than Shwe acted as head of the military, prime minister and defence minister for almost two decades. After taking power, the SLORC opened up the economy, and the military became increasingly involved in trade. A system of crony capitalism soon developed, to the advantage of military officers and their family members (Ford et al, 2015). The SLORC also significantly increased its use of forced labour to develop the country’s infrastructure, particularly in the ethnic states. In 1989, it formally changed the country’s name to (Union of) Myanmar. By the 1990s, Myanmar was reportedly among the poorest in the world (Babson in Steinberg, 2001: 168). While international business ties with other Asian countries (particularly China and Thailand) intensified, the population did not benefit. Large-scale extraction of natural resources generated profit mostly for the military and its business partners, while local populations suffered the consequences such as environmental degradation and forced relocation (Woods, 2011, 2017; Simpson, 2014; Kramer, 2015, 2021; Sekine, 2023).

Although the army continued to restrict civil liberties, it did proceed with the proposed multiparty elections and allowed political parties to register. Due to the increase in political freedoms, but also the material benefits granted to political parties such as telephone lines and petrol supplies, over 200 parties were formed. Some were considered ‘merely fronts for the military’, and the SLORC was accused of intentionally encouraging this proliferation: as long as the public was divided, it could use political stability as an argument to stay in power (Charney, 2009: 161). The most prominent party that emerged was the National League for Democracy (NLD), started by Aung San Suu Kyi and two former members of the military. Despite the apparent liberalization, Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members were harassed by the SLORC during their campaign tours (Lintner, 1990: 170–1). The military arrested between 2,000 and 6,000 NLD members, and Aung San Suu Kyi and Vice Chairman Tin U were placed under house arrest in July 1989 after being accused of subversive activities (Charney, 2009: 167). Although the military tried to ensure a favourable outcome and intimidated the opposition, it lost the elections of 27 May 1990. The NLD, with its leadership under house arrest, obtained 392 of the 447 seats it contested. Only ten seats went to the National Unity Party (NUP), the party representing the military. The rest of the seats were won by ethnic nationality parties such as the Shan and the Rakhine. Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest (or ‘protective custody’ as the military called it), and the SLORC announced that it had no intention to transfer power to the winning parties.12Close

The military then started ‘de-democratizing the country’ by further cracking down on dissidents and the political opposition (Charney, 2009: 173). It suspended the 1974 constitution and took over all decision-making power.13Close When it became clear that power would not be transferred quickly, some elected members of the NLD and other opposition groups secretly set up a parallel government, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), founded in Karen State in 1990. Its members then moved to Thailand and eventually the United States in order to lobby for their cause from exile. The NLD continued to claim the right to govern based on the 1990 election results, a position supported by the United States and other Western actors. Aung San Suu Kyi was released in 1995, then again placed under house arrest from 2000 to 2002. In 2003, she was nearly assassinated during an attack in Depayin, which many suspect was orchestrated by the military (Fink, 2009: 94). After surviving this incident, in which around 70 people died, she was again placed under ‘protective custody’ until 2010. Aung San Suu Kyi, who had gained both domestic and international popularity, refused offers to leave the country even when her husband in the UK was terminally ill. She was granted numerous international awards for her struggle for democratization, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991.14Close Meanwhile, the military leaders tried to weaken the NLD’s position, while the party also fell subject to internal rivalries and debates about the desired approach towards the military.

Despite the military’s long and intrusive rule, it continued to present itself as a transitional government. In 2003, then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced the military government’s ‘Roadmap to Democracy’. This roadmap laid out seven steps that would result in a ‘modern, developed, and democratic nation’ (Fink, 2009: 94). As a first step, it reconvened the National Convention in 2004 with the intention to draw up a new constitution; this process would take until 2007. The NLD refused to participate in the National Convention as long as its leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were imprisoned. In 2005, the military suddenly announced that it would move the country’s capital from Yangon to the newly built city Naypyidaw (‘Abode of Kings’). This move was reportedly a matter of prestige (in the past, influential kings had also established new capitals), but probably also an attempt to secure a more central location less vulnerable to foreign invasion (Farrelly, 2018).

The 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’

After a number of periodic popular uprisings in the 1990s (discussed in Chapter 2), the next large-scale protest took place in September 2007 with the so-called ‘Saffron Revolution’.15Close After the government suddenly removed the subsidies on fuel and gas prices, resulting in a doubling of bus fares overnight, activists from the 88 generation (as the group became known) staged a demonstration which resulted in several arrests (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The next month, a small group of politically educated monks staged a peaceful demonstration that was met with violence by the authorities. On 10 September, the newly formed All Burma Monks’ Alliance demanded a public apology from the military to the monks, along with a reduction of fuel prices, the release of all political prisoners and the start of a dialogue with the ‘democratic forces for national reconciliation’ (Fink, 2009: 102). The monks threatened to withhold their religious services from the SPDC leadership if their demands were not met within a week. After a week had passed, they took to the streets on 18 September and were soon joined by 88 Generation Students and some NLD members. On 22 September, they passed by the house of Aung San Suu Kyi, who made a brief appearance from behind her gate. By 24 September, an estimated 40,000–100,000 monks and laypeople took part in the protest (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2008: 132; Fink, 2009: 103).

After an initial non-violent episode, the government began hunting down the organizers. On 26 September, it opened fire on the demonstrators, including monks. The estimated number of casualties ranges from 15 (government count) to around 160 according to the opposition, and over 5,000 people were detained (Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2008: 133; Min Zin, 2010a: 91; Cheesman, 2015). In contrast to 1988, this time some international observers were present, and local journalists managed to smuggle footage to the international media (as depicted in the Oscar-winning documentary Burma VJ). Although the number of casualties was much smaller than in 1988, the images of the shooting of unarmed Buddhist monks, as well as a Japanese journalist, caused international outrage. After the crackdown by the army, the situation went back to ‘normal’, although the monks remained under surveillance, and there were said to be many infiltrators in their midst. Members of the 88 Generation Students received prison sentences of up to 65 years (Fink, 2009: 105).16Close Other dissidents fled to the Thai border. Although political prisoners were occasionally released as part of military amnesties, hundreds died in prison due to torture and neglect, while others who were released had trouble reintegrating into society and developed severe physical and mental problems (Fink, 2009).17Close The 2007 uprising put the country in the international spotlight and showed both domestic and international observers that dissidents continued to resist the military government. The uprising did not, however, bring about regime change.

A cyclone, a constitutional referendum and an election

Despite the NLD’s refusal to take part in the National Convention, and undeterred by the 2007 uprising, the military continued to the next steps of its ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, which included the drafting of a new constitution that would have to be adopted through a national referendum. Yet on 2–3 May 2008, just days before the referendum was supposed to take place, lower Myanmar (the Irrawaddy delta and Yangon) was hit by a cyclone of great magnitude. An estimated 140,000 people died, and over two million were displaced or otherwise affected. The cyclone’s severe consequences were compounded by the military’s indifferent response. Just days after this natural disaster occurred, it went ahead with the referendum, in which 98 per cent of the population reportedly voted, with 92 per cent approving the draft constitution. The 2008 constitution, which remains in place to date, has been much criticized, not only because its drafting process lacked any form of democratic consultation, but notably for its undemocratic content. It grants 25 per cent of the seats in parliament to sitting military officers, leaves three influential ministries (Home Affairs, Defence, and Border Affairs) under full control of the military, and allows for a military coup in case of emergencies. It also bars anyone with family members abroad (such as Aung San Suu Kyi) from becoming president. Since amendments require over 75 per cent approval in parliament, the military can effectively block any constitutional changes.

In line with points 5 and 6 of the ‘Roadmap to Democracy’, the military organized elections on 7 November 2010. Opposition parties were again restricted. The NLD decided to boycott the elections and was subsequently deregistered (see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of the election boycott campaign). Restrictions were also imposed on parties representing people from conflict areas such as Kachin State (TNI, 2010). Of the 37 parties that were eventually approved, only two were able to organize national campaigns: the SPDC-affiliated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the BSPP-successor, the NUP. Each had more candidates than the other 35 parties combined (Holliday, 2011: 84).18Close Neither the political opposition nor the international community considered the 2010 elections free or fair. Opposition parties had hardly been able to campaign, and voters felt pressured by the military to support the USDP, which also secured a suspiciously large number of advance votes (TNI, 2010). The results indicated a victory for the USDP, which reportedly received 77 per cent of the votes.19Close In February 2011, the parliament elected former military general and prime minister Thein Sein as president, while the vice-presidents and speakers of the lower and upper house also hailed from the USDP. Due to the undemocratic manner in which the USDP was able to win, and the continued role of both the military and its proxy party, the Thein Sein government is referred to by critics as quasi-or nominally civilian.

The quasi-civilian USDP government

Unexpectedly, in the course of 2011 President Thein Sein’s government started taking significant steps towards political reform by granting selective liberties to the political opposition and other dissidents. In May 2011, the government issued its first amnesty for thousands of prisoners, who were released or saw their sentences reduced, including 47 identified by activists as political prisoners. Hundreds more political prisoners were released as part of amnesties in October 2011 and January 2012. A secret blacklist with over 6,000 Burmese and foreign persons was revealed in 2012, and only some of these people were subsequently removed from the list (Holliday, 2013: 95; Duell, 2014: 121). By the end of 2013, a total of twelve amnesties had been issued, freeing an estimated 1,000 ‘prisoners of conscience’ (UN General Assembly report in Cheesman, 2015: 128). It must be noted, however, that these amnesties were conditional, and that no former political prisoners were formally absolved from their ‘crimes’ (Cheesman, 2015: 130). Moreover, new laws were later invoked to detain dissidents for their activities on social media or in organized demonstrations. A National Human Rights Commission set up in 2011 was heavily criticized for its lack of independence and its slow functioning (Cheesman, 2015; Liljeblad, 2016, 2017). Various new laws were passed improving labour rights and the right to peaceful assembly, although restricting conditions remained in place. Of particular significance for civil society was the introduction of the Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act in December 2011. Although this law formally allowed demonstrations to take place, the condition that organizers had to apply for permission from the authorities at least five days in advance was widely viewed as an unnecessary restriction, which moreover granted the government with new legal tools for oppression in case of ‘unlawful’ or ‘non-peaceful’ processions. Media censorship was largely abolished in August 2012, although journalists could be accused of publishing false information retroactively. The government also sought consultation with critical opposition media and civil society organizations in drafting new laws, while dissidents and journalists who continued to criticize the government were subject to prosecution.

The most visible changes, however, took place on the political level, as Aung San Suu Kyi reached an agreement with President Thein Sein to re-register her NLD party in August 2011. In the highly symbolic by-elections that were held in April 2012, she won nearly all available seats and was able to take a seat in parliament (Lidauer, 2012). In response to the NLD’s entry into the formal political sphere, the NCGUB was formally dissolved in September 2012. Another visible consequence of these political developments concerned the re-engagement of Western countries with both the government and non-state actors in the country. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton paid a visit to Myanmar in 2011, followed by President Barack Obama in 2012. After these visits, the country witnessed a steady increase of Western tourists, businesspeople and politicians who were eager to reward the government for its democratic progress.20Close For the first time in 22 years, the United States appointed a full ambassador to Myanmar in July 2012 (Pedersen, 2014). Myanmar also hosted the World Economic Forum on East Asia and the Southeast Asian Games in Naypyidaw in 2013, and assumed chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014 (Moe Thuzar, 2013). The following chapters will further explore how these developments were experienced by a variety of civil society actors based inside and outside the country and will cover the later stages of the political transition process, in which both domestic and international audiences were disappointed, although for different reasons.

Conflict and peace talks in the ethnic states

From the BSPP era onwards, the military fostered divisions between ethnic groups, favouring some ethnic elites with formal political positions and lucrative business deals while excluding others. Although large sections of the population suffered from restricted civil liberties and poverty under military rule, the estimated 30 per cent ethnic nationalities, particularly those living in the border areas, have been the primary victims of military violence. Populations in the conflict areas frequently fell victim to forced labour, rape and forced displacement (Smith, 1991, 1999; Gravers, 2007). Ethnic post-independence struggles for equal rights and self-determination became entangled with the contest for control over natural resources, predominantly located in the border areas, which both the military and EAOs sought to regulate (Woods, 2011). Various armed insurgent groups and political elites capitalized upon the sense of deprivation among ethnic nationalities to nurture ethnic identities, foment hostility towards the Burman oppressors and legitimize the armed struggle (Sadan, 2013: 337). The total number of forces within the EAOs is estimated at around 72,000 persons, as opposed to 350,000 in the Myanmar military (Selth, 2015).21Close

General Khin Nyunt, head of intelligence services and later prime minister, initiated peace talks in the 1990s and managed to arrange ceasefires with most of the 21 ‘major anti-government forces’ (Callahan, 2003: 215). Under these arrangements, EAOs were allowed to administer their own area, establish trade relations and keep their weapons until the new constitution was in place.22Close Kevin Woods (2011, 2017) argues that the military–private partnerships that resulted from some of these ceasefires, including with political elites from among the ethnic nationalities, led to new levels of exploitation of land and natural resources in the border regions, a process he refers to as ‘ceasefire capitalism’. Despite the ceasefires, by the late 1990s at least 500,000 people had died during four decades of civil strife (Smith, 1999; Callahan, 2003: 210). Fighting in the various border areas resulted in millions of internally displaced people, as well as millions of refugees in neighbouring countries such as Thailand. Although all fighting parties were suspected of involvement in human rights violations, accusations towards the Myanmar military were particularly serious, including rape, extrajudicial killings and even genocide (Matelski et al, 2022). After Thein Sein became president in 2011, he initiated new peace talks with a number of EAOs and managed to reach a ceasefire with the oldest ethnic insurgent group, the KNU, and several other parties in the first months of 2012. A formal ‘Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement’ was agreed on in October 2015 and presented to high-level international delegates, although eventually only three significant EAOs signed: the KNU, the Shan State Army (the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party), and the Chin National Front (TNI, 2017).23Close The government received support from the Norwegian-backed Myanmar Peace Support Initiative and the Yangon-based Myanmar Peace Center, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, in June 2011, the ceasefire reached with the KIA in the 1990s had broken down, resulting in a conflict that caused thousands of casualties and displaced over 100,000 people, just as the situation in central Myanmar was improving (TNI, 2013). The breakdown of ceasefires such as in Kachin State and other ethnic areas is attributed to the absence of lasting political settlements and the continued exploitation of populations in ceasefire areas (Woods, 2017; Kramer, 2021).

Under military rule, those groups not recognized in the 1982 Citizenship Act have been denied even the most basic rights, with the Rohingya as the best known example (Ferguson, 2015; Cheesman, 2017). Other ethnic and religious minorities, such as the Christian Chin, have also been subject to violence, discrimination or forced conversion to Buddhism (Sakhong, 2007: 223). The role of ethnic nationalities, their languages and their historical contributions were largely deleted from government textbooks, while ethnic organizations (described in Chapter 2) wrote their own history curricula, portraying Burmans as the enemy (Cheesman, 2003; Salem-Gervais and Metro, 2012). Many scholars regard ‘the ethnic question’ as one of the key issues to be resolved in the country (see, for example, Smith, 1991; Steinberg 2001; Gravers, 2007; South, 2008b). Others have argued the contrary, namely that the interests of ethnic nationalities have been over-represented in international platforms (Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, 2012). It is generally acknowledged that the Burman majority has been the privileged ethnic group in the country (Walton, 2012b), although the role of class within ethnic groups has arguably been under-studied (McCarthy, 2019; Doi Ra and Khu Khu Ju, 2021; Campbell and Prasse-Freeman, 2022). A number of authors have therefore focused particularly on the plight of one or several of these ethnic groups and the development of social and political ethnic organizations in the border areas (for example, Smith, 1991, 1999; South, 2004, 2008a; Laungaramsri, 2006; Gravers, 2007; Thawnghmung, 2008; Brees, 2009; Woods, 2011; Brooten, 2013; Sadan, 2013, and several publications by the Transnational Institute, or TNI). The plight of the Rohingya has also been covered extensively since 2015 (see Wade, 2017, for example, and several articles in human rights journals, including Matelski et al, 2022) and will be discussed in later chapters. The next two chapters further unpack the various identities of Myanmar’s civil society actors, including the role of ethnicity.

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